From steel to railways: can the state revitalise British industry?
Not long ago the consensus was that the West was under the sway of so-called ‘neoliberal’ ideas, implying a zeal for free markets and a limited role for the state. The reality was that the ‘free market’ was, in fact, often highly regulated by government. However, over the past decade the pendulum has swung in favour of expanding government economic interventionism. It has become de rigueur for politicians of all stripes to endorse industrial policies and protectionist measures in the pursuit of economic growth and jobs.
Many argue this simply reflects changed circumstances, rather than an ideological refresh. State activism became legitimate again as a seemingly inescapable response to the pandemic and the lockdowns. Subsequently, the renewed openness to state intervention was reinforced by the impulse for national self-sufficiency and security in a more dangerous and fragmented geopolitical world. In particular, China’s economic take-off is now usually interpreted as a threat to Western industries and jobs, justifying a resort to state aid and a retreat from free trade.
In Britain, the political momentum behind government economic activism has become near universal. Even Reform UK has been downplaying its earlier ‘smaller state’ inferences; instead, it has been promoting interventionist policies, including nationalising British Steel’s Scunthorpe plant, the government taking over failing water companies, and increasing welfare spending.
Critics question whether higher state spending and nationalisations can be afforded given record budget deficits and public debt. But perhaps such concerns are overstated, particularly if any borrowed funds are used productively, rather than being frittered away in financing inefficient day-to-day government activities. Borrowing to spend on new infrastructure wouldn’t just provide jobs in the short-run, but builds a stronger foundation for businesses to flourish in the future.
Some highlight the paradox that although the state has become more interventionist than ever, simultaneously it seems to be less potent in its results. This dilemma highlights the core question about the impact of the state: to what extent are Britain’s economic problems down to the state intervening too little, too much, or in the wrong way?
Would Britain’s potential high-growth sectors, such as the life sciences and digital technologies, benefit from a visible helping hand from the state, at least until they get up and running? Or do state incentives and subsidies mainly sustain the unprofitable activities that are encumbering this broken economy?





