Who is the party of the poor?
When the Conservatives won the Hartlepool by-election of 2021, it was seen by many commentators as illustrative of a broad shift in British politics. Labour, it was said, was no longer the party of choice for the working class. Similarly, after the 2019 general election – with a slew of ‘red wall’ seats shifting blue – it emerged that the Conservatives were more popular with low than high-income voters, and had a 15-point lead over Labour among those on low incomes.
A number of commentators suggest the origins of this shift can be found in the Brexit referendum and its aftermath, where large numbers of working-class voters voted to leave the EU. The Conservative Party quickly shifted to become the party of Brexit, but Labour continuing to be seen as the party of Remain. But Brexit, and the aftermath, shows this is not simply a shift from Labour to Tory, with the Brexit Party playing a key role, particularly in 2019’s European Parliament elections. Similarly, a number of populist parties, including Reform UK (previously the Brexit Party) and the Reclaim Party, have since made inroads with working-class voters.
Many simply dismiss the idea that parties like the Conservatives, led by the Etonian Boris Johnson, or the Brexit Party, led by former city trader Nigel Farage, could represent the working class. Today, many on the left point to Tory scandals surrounding the award of Covid contracts to insist that the ‘nasty party’ remains. Still, these accusations don’t seem to have hit home. Etonian Boris remains more popular with those on low-incomes than Knight of the Realm Keir Starmer. Moreover, many question whether any parties can represent the poor today. Perhaps figures like footballer Marcus Rashford do more for working-class families than any politician could.
Underlying this, perhaps, are broader socio-economic shifts. Education has become key to understanding social class, with divides between university-goers and others more important than other traditional class markers. Labour, the party of ‘education, education, education’, now seems to appeal more to the well-educated than to others. The Conservatives, by contrast, have pivoted to the ‘patriotic socially conservative’. Other shifts seem important too, such as growing cultural divide between the ‘Somewheres’ and ‘Anywheres’.
Whatever the reason behind these shifts, they seem set to have important consequences. For one thing, redressing regional inequality is now a greater part of the political conversation in the guise of talk about ‘levelling up’. Similarly, technical and practical education is receiving renewed attention. Some cultural issues – often referred to as ‘flag, faith and family’ – are becoming a bigger part of the conversation.
What does it even mean to be ‘poor’ today? Is it still a question of wealth or income, or does cultural capital play an increased role? How much of the recent realignment of the parties can be attributed to generational events such as Brexit, and how much is the work of broader trends? What will be the consequences of a shift in representation of the working-class vote? Who speaks for the poor today?






