From animal sentience to veganism: is human exceptionalism under threat?

The Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill currently going through parliament will, if passed, create a committee to assess whether government policies have given ‘all due regard’ to the welfare of ‘sentient animals’ – defined as ‘any vertebrate other than homo sapiens‘. The bill is part of a wider context of increasing interest in animal welfare. One example is the expanding range of animal-free products on sale, from Greggs vegan sausage rolls to Beyond Burgers. But what moral obligations, if any, do we have to animals?

Many people believe that although we should take some account of animal suffering, it is absurd to grant animals the same moral standing as we grant to people. After all, humans are rational and moral beings, self-aware and accountable in ways that animals are not. For example, unlike animals, humans can enter into agreements. According to some thinkers, the capacity for reciprocity is the basis for ‘human exceptionalism’. If we cannot expect animals to assume obligations to others, do humans have any obligations to animals?

Yet over the past 50 years, thinkers have been increasingly uneasy with this idea. In the eighteenth century, the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham was almost alone in declaring: ‘The question is not, Can it talk, nor can it reason, but can it suffer?’. But since the 1970s, his simple idea has been popularised by several philosophers, notably Peter Singer – who regards discrimination based on species as wrong in the same way that racial discrimination is wrong. One parallel often put forward is with humans with severe and irreversible mental disabilities. They are not ‘persons’ in the way that average adults are, so why then should we regard their suffering as more important than the suffering of animals that may have greater mental capacities?

Some will argue that contrary to appearances, animals will not benefit from such far-reaching policies, since they will undermine our reasons for looking after them. But animal rights or liberation activists will say that the fact that our present practices would be radically disrupted by such new policies is no reason not to pursue them. After all, they say, similar arguments were used against ending slavery.

Are there morally relevant similarities between human and animal suffering, and if so, should we take account of animals’ suffering in our treatment of them? What is ‘sentience’ anyway, and which animals possess it, if any? Should we accord the same moral importance to animal suffering as we give to human suffering? If so, how much further should we go: should we grant rights to animals, and if so, rights to what?